### Help

I've looked at something so long that I have confused myself, and am now hoping to get a little help. Paul Boghossian makes the following charge against analyticity (and smart people quote this approvingly):

What could it possibly mean to say that the truth of a statement is fixed exclusively by its meaning and not by the facts? Isn't it in general true--indeed, isn't it a truism--that for any statementSSis true iff for somep,Smeans thatpandp?

How could the mere fact thatSmeans thatpmake it the case thatSis true? Doesn't it also have to be the case thatp? (Nous1996, p.364)

Now my question: Is it fair to impute to Boghossian the view that there are no

**S**,

**p**such that

*is a sufficient condition for*

**S**means that**p***?*

**S**is true(The upshot: if this is fair, then I think any case where

**S**expresses a logical truth

**p**is a counterexample. I still the the 'truism' is true; I just don't think it establishes the claim I'm imputing to Boghossian.)